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Abstract
We usually reject information from sources we dislike. But what if those same sources explicitly disagree with that infor-
mation? Are we more likely to be persuaded by information that is opposed by someone we dislike? We present results
from an experimental study with a convenience sample of 199 Dutch students. Respondents were exposed to counter-
attitudinal information on climate change in an attempt to generate persuasion, and in a second time exposed to a tweet
from the current US president, Donald J. Trump, as a positive or negative endorsement of the counter-attitudinal. Results
show that positive endorsements reduce the persuasive power of counter-attitudinal information, whereas negative en-
dorsements (marginally) increase its persuasive power. These results have important implications in today’s politics, where
“disliked” figures—most of the time referred to as “populists”—play an increasingly central role in framing the terms of
the debate on the most salient issues.
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1. Introduction
Beyond politics and policy, one of the most defining el-
ements of the Trump presidency is the blurring of the
boundaries between official White House communica-
tions and personal outbursts from the President on social
media. Trump’s profuse use of Twitter—characterized by
the trifecta of simplicity, impulsivity, and incivility (Ott,
2017)—is a central part of the narrative that portrays
him as thin-skinned and quick to anger, deceitful, brazen,
and boasting a grandiose sense of self and an exagger-
ated vision of his accomplishments. Several observers
(Nai & Maier, 2018, 2019; Visser, Book, & Volk, 2017)
have pointed to Trump’s apparent narcissistic tenden-
cies and his “sky-high extroversion combined with off-
the-chart low agreeableness” (McAdams, 2016), and to
the fact that his actions display “a messiah complex, no
conscience, and lack complete empathy” (Hoise, 2017).
Trump is however not, by far, the only world leader
often accused of displaying an abrasive public persona
(on social media, or otherwise). Recent years have seen
a renewed focus to the emergence of populist figures
worldwide (Albertazzi &McDonnell, 2008;Mudde, 2004;
Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Beyond their elec-
toral success and communication strategies (Jagers &
Walgrave, 2007; Mudde, 2007; Nai, 2018), several stud-
ies increasingly point to the fact that populists promote
a “bad mannered” and “transgressive” political style
(Moffitt, 2016; Oliver & Rahn, 2016) that “emphasises ag-
itation, spectacular acts, exaggeration, calculated provo-
cations, and the intended breech of political and socio-
cultural taboos” (Heinisch, 2003, p. 94). A recent study by
Nai and Martínez i Coma (2019) found that, when com-
pared to “mainstream political figures,” populists score
lower on agreeableness, emotional stability, and consci-
entiousness, but score significantly higher on the Dark
Triad of narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism.
Social media bolsters these trends and allow pop-
ulists to efficiently diffuse their messages (Engesser,
Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017). In this article, however,
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we are not interested in describing how populists com-
municate on social media, and neither how their image
is shaped by it (for this, see, e.g., Ahmadian, Azarshahi,
& Paulhus, 2017; Enli, 2017; Ott, 2017). Rather, we
focus on its consequences for the persuasiveness of
their messages. Overall—partially contrasting with the
contemporary narrative of elections easily swung by
(mis)information campaigns on social media—relatively
little is known about the persuasive power of politi-
cal communication on social media (but see Allcott &
Gentzkow, 2017). Even more importantly, little is known
about the persuasive power of communication from con-
troversial figures.
1.1. Persuasion and Affective Polarization
The dynamics of political persuasion have received
strong attention in recent decades (e.g., Cobb &
Kuklinski, 1997; Mutz, Sniderman, & Brody, 1996).
Central in this literature is the idea that persuasion
is achieved when individuals are exposed to counter-
attitudinal messages, that is, messages that clash with
their previously held beliefs, and adjust those beliefs
accordingly. Inversely, resistance to persuasion exists
when “an attitude change is capable of surviving an at-
tack from contrary information” (Petty & Brinol, 2010,
p. 240). Persuasion is endemic in contemporary politics,
where voters are exposed to an endless stream of parti-
san information.
Much attention has been provided to individual dif-
ferences in resistance to persuasive attempts, for in-
stance in terms of personal relevance of the issue (Petty,
Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981) or issue-related emotional
states (Nai, Schemeil, & Marie, 2017). Persuasion is also
affected by characteristics of the message itself; evi-
dence exists that specific characteristics of the source
of the persuasive message also matter, for instance in
terms of credibility (Tormala & Petty, 2004) or likeabil-
ity (Reinhard & Messner, 2009) of the source. Especially
this last factor—how much the respondent “likes” the
source of persuasion—has received a strong attention,
confirming a general rationale that liked sources are
more likely to persuade, a claim that is central in many
dual models of opinion formation (Chaiken, 1980; Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986).
Little is known however about the effects on per-
suasion effectiveness when information comes from dis-
liked figures (but seeWeber, Dunaway, & Johnson, 2012).
Mounting evidence suggests that ideological polariza-
tion is being replacedwith affective polarization (Iyengar,
Sood, & Lelkes, 2012), as disagreements in the public
are increasingly driven by a profound dislike for the op-
ponents regardless of their policy alignments. What is
increasingly likely to drive the alignment and dealign-
ment of opinions are social identity dynamics of in-group
and out-group, where what matters the most is pushing
back against the disliked out-group. With this in mind,
it is then not surprising to witness that disliked figures
have an important role to play in contemporary poli-
tics. A substantial part of today’s electoral politics can
be explained as voting not “for” a specific party or can-
didate, but rather “against” them; this is one of the main
drivers of support for populist and so-called “anti-elitist”
parties (Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013), and a key ele-
ment in referenda across the world (Lupia & Matsusaka,
2004). In this sense, assessing the role of source dis-
likewithin persuasive communication is not only epochal
due to the growing importance of “antagonistic” figures
worldwide—and to get a better sense, ultimately, about
how “populist” and other controversial figures manage
(or fail to manage) to persuade voters in the first place—
but also central for a more complete understanding of
the consequences of affective polarization.
1.2. The Study and the Setting
In this article, we discuss a theoretical model that ex-
plains under which conditions people resist persuasive
attempts, and we apply this to an experimental protocol
where respondents were exposed to mock tweets from
Donald Trump. We test two overarching claims: (1) be-
ing confronted to counter-attitudinal information leads
to a readjustment of initial opinions (what we call “per-
suasion”); and (2) cues from a disliked source affect the
persuasive power of counter-attitudinal information—
more specifically, persuasion is reduced when the dis-
liked source endorses the counter-attitudinal informa-
tion, and it is increasedwhen the disliked source opposes
the counter-attitudinal information.
We test this model via an experimental protocol
where all participants are first asked their opinion about
an initial statement (would they support slowing down
economic activity to reduce climate warming); depend-
ing on their answer, all participants are then exposed to
a tailored counter-attitudinal information, that is, infor-
mation promoting the other side (for instance, reasons
why economic activity should be slowed down if they sig-
nalled that they would rather not support a slowdown in
the first place). After exposure to the counter-attitudinal
information, all participants are asked again their opin-
ion about economy slowdown. Divergence between the
two statements (pre- and post-counter-attitudinal) indi-
cates readjustment of initial opinions, or persuasion (Nai
et al., 2017).
The experimental component intervenes before this
second question, just after exposure to the counter-
attitudinal information. Participants in two experimen-
tal groups are exposed to one additional piece of infor-
mation, framed as a cue form a disliked source (Trump),
taking the form of either an endorsement or an opposi-
tion to the counter-attitudinal information; a first group
is told that the disliked source approves the counter-
attitudinal information (consonant source cue), whereas
the second group is told that the disliked source opposes
the counter-attitudinal information (dissonant source
cue). Respondents in the control group are only ex-
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posed to the counterargument (no consonant/dissonant
source cue). More details about the design are described
in Section 3.2.
The experimental components of the protocol—the
“disliked source cues”—are based on (mock) tweets from
Donald Trump, signalling either support or opposition
to the counter-attitudinal piece of information respon-
dents are exposed to. Donald Trump is a perfect subject
for real-world experimental research (Resnick, 2018), es-
pecially for research on persuasion and likeability. First,
he benefits from constant exposure in US and interna-
tional media, and thus it is fair to assume that he is fairly
well known by all respondents, even outside the US as in
our case (participants are undergraduate students at the
University of Amsterdam). Second, Trump suffers from
almost universal dislike outside the US (Wike, Stokes,
Poushter, & Fetterlof, 2017) and its coverage in interna-
tional media is strongly skewed towards the negative
(Patterson, 2017); in this case, he is the perfect real-
world candidate for the study on source (un)likeability, as
there is a strong chance that recruited participants have
already an overall negative opinion about him; as we will
see, this is indeed the case. Third, his unique public per-
sona (Nai & Maier, 2018, 2019; Visser et al., 2017) man-
ifests into frequent opinion shifts on salient issues—for
instance, a 2016 Washington Post article (also cited by
Resnick, 2018) discusses howTrumppublicly took five dif-
ferent positions on abortion in a handful of days (Bump,
2016). This chronic inconsistency is a perk for experi-
mental research, as it allows to create mock statements
that are diametrically opposite to fit our treatments—
in our case, mock tweet messages that support oppo-
site stances on climate change. This helps circumvent a
well-known limitation in experimental researchwith real-
world figures, that is, the fact that mock treatments have
to be consistent with the profile of those figures to be re-
alistic. Given Trump’s lack of consistency over important
issues, virtually every message and its opposite should
be considered at the very least conceivable.
2. Source Cues and Persuasion
The starting point of our model is the persuasive power
of counter-attitudinal messages. Even in an environ-
ment where filter bubbles and selective exposure drive
consumption of information that is perceived as con-
gruent with one’s own opinions and predispositions
(Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Metzger, Hartsell,
& Flanagin, 2015), people are nonetheless constantly
exposed to counter-attitudinal information (Messing &
Westwood, 2014).
People are however hardwired to reject such counter-
attitudinal information. Following established models
of motivated reasoning (Lodge & Taber, 2000; Taber &
Lodge, 2006), people are driven by directional (or parti-
san) goals “to apply their reasoning powers in defense
of a prior, specific conclusion” (Taber & Lodge, 2006,
p. 756). Initial beliefs “bias” the way citizens respond
to partisan information and people tend to evaluate
more favorably messages that are in line with their pre-
existing beliefs (“prior attitude effect”; Taber & Lodge,
2006); at the same time, people tend to reject counter-
attitudinal messages.
Nonetheless, if not a full reversal, exposure to
counter-attitudinal messages should operate at the very
least a readjustment. Following “on-line” information
processing models, people keep a “mental tally” of all in-
formation encountered about a specific issue; they form
judgments as a function of the sequence of informa-
tion on that issue they are exposed to, and adjust their
judgment with any new piece of information received
(McGraw, Lodge, & Stroh, 1990; Redlawsk, 2001, 2002).
This adjustment is expected to be stronger for people low
in cognitive skills (McGrawet al., 1990), but it is supposed
to exist across the board:
H1: Exposure to counter-attitudinal arguments pro-
duces a readjustment of initial opinions.
Many elements intervene to shape the magnitude of
this readjustment. In this article, we focus on a previ-
ously overlooked element: the presence of supporting
information (source cues) advocating for or against the
counter-attitudinal messages. More specifically, we ar-
gue that resistance to counter-attitudinal information is,
first, a direct function of the presence of cues from a dis-
liked source (in our case, an endorsement from Trump),
and, second, mediated by the level of cognitive skills of
the respondent. We discuss below a theoretical model
with two components: (1) the role of consonant disliked
source cues on the treatment of counter-attitudinal in-
formation; and (2) the role of dissonant disliked source
cues on that treatment.
We define a disliked “consonant” source cue as a
piece of information provided by an external source
(Trump) that is aligned with the content of the persua-
sive information. Let’s take an example, in which a per-
son that usually dislikes burgers is told: (1) that “Big
Kahuna burgers are the best burgers in town”; and that
(2) Trump very much likes them. The two pieces of infor-
mation are consistent with each other in the eyes of the
respondent (remember that they dislike both those burg-
ers and Trump). The information they receive is “conso-
nant,” and because it contrastswith their initially held be-
liefs the person will probably not have a hard time to re-
ject both. Inversely, a “dissonant” source cue exists when
the persuasive message contrasts with the endorsement
from the source. In our example, the person is told that
Big Kahuna burgers are great, but that Trump dislikes
them. In such a case, the two persuasive components
of the new information conflict with each other. Both
“consonant” and “dissonant” source cues thus only re-
fer to their relationship with the initial persuasive mes-
sage, and not with the respondent initial beliefs. This
is illustrated in Figure 1. The situation would of course
be reversed in case of a positively evaluated source cue
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Figure 1. Consistent and inconsistent systems of beliefs and counter-attitudinal information.
(e.g., endorsement of the counter-attitudinal informa-
tion from a political figure that the respondent likes), but
this is not something we test here.
We start with the setting of a consistent system of be-
liefs and counter-attitudinal information. In this first case,
this refers to being exposed to counter-attitudinal infor-
mation which is endorsed by a disliked figure. We expect
that endorsements by disliked sources steal the thunder
from persuasive messages. Persuasion is all about con-
vincing the subject that his or her previously held be-
liefs (if any) are not as anchored as he or she might have
believed—opposite rationales exist, the subject might
feel, and those rationales actually seem to make sense.
Research shows that persuasion is more likely in-
duced when the source or the sponsor of persuasive
messages is liked by the subject (Chaiken, 1980; Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986). The cognitive mechanism supporting
this effect, going back to motivated reasoning, is simply
a decrease in the automatic defences against counter-
attitudinal information due to positive feelings towards
the source of the message. Within this context, an en-
dorsement by a disliked figure should operate in the
other direction. If the default position is to reject infor-
mation that clashes with our predispositions (Lodge &
Taber, 2000; Taber & Lodge, 2006) then not only does an
endorsement from a disliked figure not mitigate this mo-
tivated bias, but it should logically enforce it. In this case,
the counter-attitudinal information should be more eas-
ily rejected:
H2. Persuasion is less effective when it is endorsed by
a disliked figure
The opposite situation is one of an inconsistent system
of beliefs and counter-attitudinal information, where in-
dividuals are exposed to counter-attitudinal information
that is opposed by a disliked figure. In this situation, we
expect respondents to experience cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1962; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Levy,
2015): They signal a preference for argument A, but are
exposed to the new information that a disliked figure also
endorses the argument A. The clash, in this case, is not ex-
ternal, between predispositions and exogenous persua-
sion, but rather internal between two sets of beliefs (sup-
port for the argument and dislike for the person that also
supports that argument). It is not our goal to study the
extent of cognitive dissonance in our respondents; rather
we expect this mental state to shatter previously held be-
liefs, paving the way for successful persuasive attempts.
Cognitive dissonance robs individuals of their certainties,
and thus creates conditions where tailored counterar-
guments are more likely to be accepted and processed
(Harmon-Jones, 2002; Whittaker, 1964). On top of this,
there are also reasons to expect that the persuasive mes-
sage itself is made more palatable in this case. Knowing
that Trump rejects amessage could suggest that themes-
sage itself is not that bad, for those who despise the can-
didate. The enemy of my enemy is my friend, or in this
case the opinion opposed by my enemy might actually
be relevant after all:
H3. Persuasion is more effective when it is opposed
by a disliked figure.
3. Methods
3.1. Participants
The experimental survey was administered to a con-
venience sample of 272 undergraduate students in
Communication Science at the University of Amsterdam
inOctober 2017. Students have to collect a given amount
of “research credits” during their undergraduate stud-
ies (14), and this research provided participants with
a modest incentive in this sense (0.18 research cred-
its). Convenience samples, especially when composed
by such a narrow segment of the population (students)
cannot be expected to be representative of the whole
population. In this sense, results should not be gener-
alised beyond the boundaries of the sample. This be-
ing said, this type of sample has been shown to pose
less problems than expected in terms of external valid-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 122–132 125
ity (Druckman & Kam, 2011). Furthermore, working with
student samples offers some specific advantages. For in-
stance, due to their younger age, students tend to have
more ductile opinions and predispositions (Lau & Erber,
1985; Pinkleton, Um, & Austin, 2002), and thus are good
subjects for studies about persuasion. Furthermore, for
students age and education effects should cancel each
other out (Garramone, 1984).
Unsurprisingly, the sample is far from representative
of trends in the general population. In the initial sam-
ple before filtering (see below), 84% of respondents are
female (reflecting the composition of students at the
University of Amsterdam) and 42% are Dutch nationals.
Although 82% declared that English is not their main lan-
guage, the overwhelming majority of participants have
an excellent command of English (also reflecting a known
characteristics of the Dutch population). On average, re-
spondents are somewhat interested in politics and only
averagely knowledgeable about climate change facts;
they however declare an average high anxiety about the
issue (M = 3.17/4, SD = 0.94). Overall, the sample is
slightly skewed towards the left (M= 3.97/10, SD= 2.03).
3.2. Design and Treatments
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three
conditions: control group; treatment 1; or treatment 2.
All respondents were, first, provided with an introduc-
tion presenting some facts about global warming (e.g.,
that 16 of the 17warmest years on record occurred since
2001), and thenwere asked to answer a few factual ques-
tions and to report their self-reported emotions when
thinking about global warming. The experimental setting
followed, introduced for everyone with a short incipit
that suggests a potential solution (see Supplementary
Material). Figure 2 presents the design of our study at
a glance.
After this incipit, all respondents were asked to what
extent they support economy slowdown in their country
to reduce climate warming (from 0 “Absolutely no” to 10
“Absolutely yes”). This question was used as initial bench-
mark of the respondents’ position and was compared
with an identical question after the treatments to gauge
opinion change (ourmain dependent variable, compared
across groups). Answers to this initial question were also
used to tailor the information that respondents received
next; we replicate the design of a previous study (Nai
et al., 2017) and provided each respondent with a spe-
cific counterargument depending on his or her answer
to the initial question. For instance, a respondent that be-
lieves that economic activity should be reduced received
a counterargument suggesting reasons why this should
not be the case. A similar (but reversed) counterargu-
ment was proposed to respondents that disagree with
economy slowdown. These counterarguments represent
the persuasive component of the design.
Control group
No addional info
Treatment 2
Addional info: Trump opposes
counterargument (tweet)
Treatment 1
Addional info: Trump supports
counterargument (tweet)
Counterargument
“However, …”
Counterargument
“However, …”
NO
YES
Final queson (Q2)
In light of this new informaon,
would you support a reducon
in economic acvity in your
country?
Inial queson (Q1)
To reduce climate warming,
would you support a
reducon in economic
acvity in your country?
Control group
No addional info
Treatment 2
Addional info: Trump opposes
counterargument (tweet)
Treatment 1
Addional info: Trump supports
counterargument (tweet)
Final queson (Q2)
In light of this new informaon,
would you support a reducon
in economic acvity in your
country?
Figure 2. Experimental design.
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After this initial set of information and counterargu-
ments, the experimental component of the study started.
Respondents in treatment groups were shown a tweet
fromTrumpeither in favour (group 1) or against (group 2)
the counterargument, plus a final statement that sums
up Trump’s position. For instance, respondents thatwere
in favour of economy slowdown were told the follow-
ing just after the counterargument: “This alternative po-
sition is strongly supported by USA President Donald
Trump, who recently said in a tweet that climate change
is an invention of liberal news media, aiming at reduc-
ing the international US competitiveness. Trump thus be-
lieves that economic activity should not be reduced” (see
Figure 3a). Similarly, respondents that believe that eco-
nomic activity should not be reduced were exposed to
a mock tweet that supports the opposite position. After
this treatment, respondents were asked again to evalu-
ate, in the light of this new information, whether they
support economy slowdown.
The second treatment was similar but reversed. In
this case respondents in the treatment groups, after
being exposed to the counterargument, were shown a
tweet where Trump signals his opposition to that coun-
terargument. The questionnaire, including the mock
tweets used as treatment, is in the Supplementary
Material. Respondents in the control groupwere not pro-
vided with any further information.
Figure 3 presents the two mock Trump tweets that
were used in the experiment. Figure 3a shows the
mock tweet where Trump opposes economic slowdown,
whereas Figure 3b shows the mock tweet where Trump
supports the slowdown. The tweets are similar in length.
They differ of course in the topics presented; the first
refers to US manufacturing sector whereas the second
refers to China and the issue of pollution. However, the
two tweets are extremely similar in framing and tone;
both tweets refer to “fake newsmedia”—one of Trump’s
most known catchphrases—make a similar use of capi-
talization of selected works (HOAX, STOP) and exclama-
tion marks, which are also a distinctive trait of Trump’s
social media use, and use a very similar direct and “low”
language (Ostiguy, 2009). In this sense, the tweets have
many more elements in common than elements that dif-
ferentiate them and can in our opinion be seen as rather
comparable—beyond of course their main difference in
the position advocated, which is the experimental com-
ponent we use in our group comparisons.
3.3. Opinion Change
The dependent variable in all our analyses—opinion
change after persuasion—is measured by comparing an-
swers to the question “Do you support economy slow-
down?” before and after the treatment. We subtracted
the score at the first question from the score at the
second question. The higher the score, the higher the
change in opinions after exposure to counterarguments;
positive scores signal a stronger agreement to economy
slowdown after treatment, whereas negative scores sig-
nal a stronger disagreement. Descriptive statistics are
presented in Table A1 in the Supplementary Material;
the table excludes respondents that are filtered out—see
Section 3.4.
3.4. Filters
We employ two filters. The first one ensures that our
analyses are run only on respondents that dislike Trump.
Before the experiment, a battery of questions asked all
respondents to evaluate a series of public figures (Julian
Assange, Donald Trump, Geert Wilders, Hillary Clinton,
Pope Francis, Rihanna, and Vladimir Putin), presented in
a random order, using the feeling thermometer devel-
oped by the ANES research group (Wilcox, Sigelman, &
Cook, 1989) on a 0–100 scale. Unsurprisingly, the aver-
age “warmth” for Trump over the whole sample is ex-
tremely low (M = 9.86, SD = 13.94)—almost half of the
average score for the next most disliked figure in our bat-
tery, Putin (M = 18.62, SD = 20.98). The higher average
“warmth” is for Rihanna (M = 65.54, SD = 21.05), fol-
lowed by the Pope (M = 52.94, SD = 21.42). To ensure
that only respondents that dislike Trump are included
in the final sample, we dropped all respondents whose
warmth for the candidate was higher than 30 out of 100.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.Mock tweets (treatments). (a) Trump mock tweet (against slowdown), (b) Trump mock tweet (in favour of slow-
down).
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The second filter is a screener (or “attention check”;
Berinsky, Margolis, & Sances, 2014) set up as long ques-
tion with specific instructions “hidden” in the middle (in
our case, to simply chose the option “other” and write
“dinosaur” in the allowed space). Respondents that failed
to comply with those instructions are assumed to only
having skimmed the questions and are filtered out. After
excluding respondents that either do not have a strong
dislike for Trump (19) or that fail the attention check (71),
our final sample is composed of 199 respondents.
4. Results
The first clear result is that persuasion works. At differ-
ent degrees, and depending on the experimental condi-
tions, all results converge towards the fact that, when
exposed to a counter-attitudinal argument, respondents
on average readjust their prior opinions. Figures 4 and 5
show this trend: Respondents that had an initial opinion
in favour of economy slowdown are less likely to support
it when exposed to counter-attitudinal information (e.g.,
Figure 4a); in the same way, respondents that were ini-
tially against economy slowdown are more likely to think
that it is a good ideawhen exposed to counter-attitudinal
information (e.g., Figure 4b). We now test under which
conditions this is more likely to happen, looking at the
congruence of source cues.
4.1. Trump Agrees with the Persuasive Message
We first test the assumption that the persuasive power
of counterarguments is stripped away when they are sup-
ported by a disliked figure (in our case, Trump). Figure 4
contrasts themean opinion change score for respondents
in the control group with themean score for respondents
that have been told that Trump supports the counterar-
gument. Figure 4a is for respondents that declared an ini-
tial support for economy slowdown (and thus received
a counterargument that tried to convince them that the
slowdown would be ineffective and potentially harmful),
whereas Figure 4b is for respondents that initially rejected
the idea of economy slowdown. Remember that due to
variables coding higher positive scores on the dependent
variable (y-axis) signal a move towards increased agree-
ment towards the slowdown, whereas high negative
scores signal a move towards increased disagreement.
Let’s first observe respondents that initially agreed
with economy slowdown as a solution of global warm-
ing (Figure 4a). For those respondents, we find strong
confirmation of our expectation. Compared to the con-
trol group, the group that was told that Trump agrees
with the counterargument was significantly less likely
to change their opinion. The difference between the
two groups is important and statistically significant,
t(77) = −4.16, p < 0.001, d = 0.95. A similar trend can
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Figure 4. Treatment 1 effects: Trump “agrees” with the persuasive message. (a) Initially in favour of economy slow-
down, (b) Initially against economy slowdown. Notes: N(control) = 37, N(treatment) = 42 (Figure 4a); N(control) = 26,
N(treatment) = 23 (Figure 4b).
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be observed as well for respondents that initially op-
posed economy slowdown (Figure 4b): Being told that
Trump supports the persuasive argument makes respon-
dents less likely to change their opinion when compared
with the control group. The difference between the two
groups is only significant at 10% and less dramatic than
in Figure 4a, t(47) = 1.70, p < 0.096, d = 0.50. Overall,
this suggests that people are more likely to resist per-
suasion when the persuasive message is endorsed by
despised figures. This provides a contrario confirmation
that source likeability alsoworks in reverse: Dislike drives
resistance to persuasion.
4.2. Trump Disagrees with the Persuasive Message
The second treatment reverses the logic of the first,
and deals with the effects of dissonant disliked source
cues. In lay language, instead of supporting the counter-
attitudinal information as in the first treatment here
Trump opposes it (and, thus, he supports the respon-
dent’s initial position). The intuition here is that respon-
dents will be more likely to accept the persuasive in-
formation if they are informed that Trump opposes it.
Our results show only partial support of this expectation
(Figure 5).
Contrarily to what expected, respondents that ini-
tially agree with economy slowdown (Figure 5a) in the
control group do not have stronger levels of opinion
change (which wouldmean that they disagreemore with
economy slowdown after being exposed to the coun-
terargument) than respondents in the control group,
t(74) = −0.10, p = 0.846. The absence of difference be-
tween the twogroupsmean that being told that a disliked
figure (Trump) opposes a persuasive message does not
makesmore likely for this persuasivemessage to be effec-
tive and result in opinion change. The figure offers how-
ever a striking contrast with respondents that have been
exposedwith the first treatment (Figure 4a), as discussed
before. Figure 5b shows trends that are in the direction of
our expectations—for respondents that initially disagree
with the slowdown, being told that Trump opposes the
persuasive argument makes respondents slightly more
likely to be persuaded and change their opinion. The dif-
ference between the two groups is, however, again not
statistically significant, t(42) = −0.65, p = 0.519.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Societal conflict lines are increasingly drawn based on
how much we dislike our opponents, and less so on how
much we disagree with their policy proposals. Assessing
the extent of this “affective polarization,” Iyengar et al.
(2012) show, for instance, that in the USA over the past
50 years the use of negative stereotypes to describe
the opponents (e.g., mean, hypocritical, selfish, closed-
minded) has increased exponentially. Within this set-
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Figure 5. Treatment 2 effects: Trump “disagrees” with the persuasive message. (a) Initially in favour of economy slow-
down, (b) Initially against economy slowdown. Notes: N(control) = 37, N(treatment) = 39 (Figure 5a); N(control) = 26,
N(treatment) = 18 (Figure 5b).
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 122–132 129
ting, it is thus perhaps unsurprising that controversial fig-
ures thrive. Agitators, provocateurs, and bad-mannered,
populists have their moment in the spotlight and, in
some cases, in governments worldwide (Nai & Martínez
i Coma, 2019). The increasing affective polarization and
consolidation of controversial figures raises a fundamen-
tal question: To what extent is the success of (populist)
persuasive messages a function of their affective as-
sessment by the public at large? In this article, we ex-
plored this overarching question via an experimental
setting where respondents in a Dutch student sample
were exposed to persuasive tailored counterarguments
to their expressed opinion (on climate change), and sub-
sequently exposed to cues—either in favour or against
the counterarguments—from a disliked figure, and one
of the most illustrious examples of the current populist
zeitgeist: Donald Trump.
In a nutshell, our results suggest that: (1) persuasion
works—at different degrees, and depending on the ex-
perimental conditions, respondents on average readjust
their prior opinions when they are exposed to a counter-
attitudinal argument; (2) positive endorsements from a
disliked source reduce the persuasive power of counter-
attitudinal information (being told that Trump supports
the persuasive argument makes respondents less likely
to change their opinion); and (3) negative endorsements
from a disliked source increase the persuasive power of
counter-attitudinal information (being told that Trump
opposes the persuasive argument makes respondents
slightly more likely to be persuaded and change their
opinion—although not is a significant way).
All in all, our results show that the persuasive power
or counter-attitudinal information exists as a function of
(positive or negative) endorsement fromdisliked sources.
This suggests that endorsements matter in political pro-
paganda, and that the persuasive power of arguments
can be manipulated by external sources.
Much has been said already about the 2016
Presidential election in themedia and academic debates.
A leitmotif, at least in liberal circles, was that many
Trump supporters uncritically accepted, shared and pro-
cessed low-quality anti-Clinton propaganda and “fake
news” (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017), which might have in-
creased his electoral appeal. Our results suggest that a
similar phenomenon could be at play also among de-
tractors of the current President: A simple endorsement
from Trump (positive or negative) substantially alters
how issue-based messages are perceived, regardless of
their direction, valence, and content. This being said, the
question remains open about the political implications
of this effect, and about why many (on both sides of the
partisan divide) seem to forego most critical skills when
it comes to the current US president (Nai &Maier, 2019).
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